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CRIiINAL LAW - RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS - KNOWLEDGE
ELEMENT - VARIANCE BETWEEN INDICTMENT AND INSTRUCTION. -
Defendant was indicted for receiving stolen goods "well knowing"
them to have been stolen. The statute under which the indictment
was framed provided for conviction if accused "knows or has rea-
son to believe" that the goods were stolen. The court instructed
the jury that they should convict if defendant knew or had cause to
believe the property to have been stolen. From a verdict of guilty,
defendant appealed. Held, that this instruction was erroneous as
embracing two ways in which the offense might have been com-
mitted, Whereas the indictment was restricted to only one.
Judgment reversed. State v. Lewis.1
Guilty knowledge, being the gist of the offense of receiving
stolen goods, 2 must be averred and proved. From the very nature
of the crime, it is necessary that this knowledge be capable of proof
by inference from circumstances.3 Since the courts generally say
that the knowledge element is sufficiently established where circum-
stances give rise to an inference that the accused believed that the
goods were stolen at the time he received them,4 a belief is sufficient
gfor conviction, even though the indictment, in consonance with the
statutory definition of the crime, charges the accused with knowing
-that the goods were stolen. In such cases, the courts base their
decisions on the ground that for the purposes of the statute there
is no difference between knowledge and belief." On this proposition,
both the majority and dissenting judges in the principal case are
agreed."
1187 S. E. 315 (W. Va. June, 1936). A dissenting opinion which cites
authority in support of the original dissent is reported in 187 S. B. 728 (W.
Va. Oct., 1936). A concurring opinion elucidating the original holding is re-
ported in 188 S. E. 473 (W. Va. Dec., 1936). This comment discusses the case
as modified or explained by these later filed opinions.
2 3 BISHOP, NEw CRImINAL PRocEDUr (1931) § 986; 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL
LAw (9th ed. 1923) § 1138; 2 WHARTON, CRmINAL LAw (11th ed. 1912) §
1229.
3Id. at § 1230; 3 BISHoP, NEw CRimnnAL PnocFDUR § 991.
4 That a guilty belief satisfies the requirement that the accused have guilty
knowledge has been held in a long line of cases: State v. Stathos, 208 N. C.
456, 181 S. E. 273 (1935) ; State v. Ilan Treese, 198 Iowa 984, 200 N. W. 570
(1924) ; Ellison v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 305, 227 S. W. 458 (1921) ; Regina
v. White, 1 F. & F. 665 (1859). Among the numerous cases containing dicta
to the same effect are Commonwealth v. Baker, 1.15 Pa. Super. 183, 187, 175
Atl. 438 (1934) ; Meath v. State, 174 Wis. 80, 83, 182 N. W. 334 (1921) ; Com-
monwealth v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 479, 4 N. E. 96 (1886).
5State v. Treese; Commonwealth v. Leonard; Meath v. State; Common-
wealth v. Baker, all sumra n. 4, are cases which say expressly that belief is
equivalent to knowledge.
6 187 S. E. 315, 318; 187 S. E. 728; 188 S. E. 473, cited supra n. 1.
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The difference of opinion in the case seems to be based on a
difference in the interpretation of the meaning and purpose of the
phrase "reason to believe ' 7 which appears in the 1931 statute8 de-
fining the crime of receiving stolen goods. The majority of the
court interpret the phrase to mean the existence of circumstances
which aught to create9 a belief in the mind of the accused that the
goods were stolen. Under this interpretation, the words "reason
to believe" in the statute are designed to dispense with the necessity
of establishing either knowledge or its equivalent, belief, in order
to secure a conviction. This construction of the statute would per-
mit a conviction under a less quantum of proof than is required
when knowledge or belief must be proved because the necessity of
establishing the mental reaction of the accused to the extant facts
is thus dispensed with. The dissenting judges treat the phrase
"reason to believe" as meaning a belief founded in reason.0  Under
this interpretation, the word "reason" would merely be descriptive
of the factual circumstances on which the mental reaction, i.e., be-
lief, of the accused must be based. The phrase "reason to believe"
thus meaning the same thing as "believe", and belief being
eqivalent to knowledge, the quantum of proof necessary for con-
viction would be exactly the same whether the prosecution set out
to establish that defendant knew or that he had reason to believe.
The cases cited by the dissenting judges" show that the phrase
"reason to believe" is used in conjunction with other language in
such a manner as to preclude interpreting it as meaning "be-
lieve".'2 The courts apparently confine their use of the phrase to
7 The instruction complained of did not use the words "reason to believe"
but charged that if ". . . . defendant knew or had cause to believe ....
that the jury should convict. The majority opinion takes notice of the sub-
stitution of the word "cause" for the word "reason" as it appears in the
statute, but the case is considered as if the lower court had used the exact
words of the statute.
8 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 3, § 18.
0 The words "ought to create" appear in the case of Meath v. State, 174
Wis. 80, 182 N. W. 334 (1921), which is quoted with approval in the con-
curring opinion in 188 S. E. 473. It is used here to illustrate the interpreta-
tion which the court places on the word "reason".
10 See the dissenting opinion, 187 S. E. 315, 317 (W. Va. 1936).
11 187 S. E. 728 (W. Va. 1936).
12 That defendant ought to have known is not enough; the jury must be
satisfied that he did know or believe, Meath v. State, 174 Wis. 80, 182 N. W.
334 (1921); circumstances causing a reasonable man to believe is evidence
from which the jury may infer knowledge, Ellison v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky.
305, 227 S. W. 458 (1921); knowledge may be proved by circumstantial
evidence sufficient to cause defendant to believe, State v. Van Treese, 198
Iowa 984, 200 N. W. 570 (1924). Late cases to the same effect are State v.
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defining what constitutes a valid basis for an inference that the
accused had the requisite guilty knowledge or belief. In other
words, "reason to believe" is used as meaning factual circum-
stances. Thus the interpretation of the majority of the court in
the present case appears to be sustained by the decided cases in
other jurisdictions. Since this interpretation of the statute
recognizes a difference in the amount of circumstantial proof
necessary to establish knowledge as distinguished from reason to
believe, it is clear that the rights of the accused are prejudiced by
instructions such as are urged as cause for reversal in the present
case.
However, that there is an alternative approach to the ques-
tion culminating in a result differing from that of the present case
is illustrated by a recent Alabama decision.1 In that case, the
Alabama court, when called upon to decide a problem identical"
with that presented in the principal case, interpreted the statute
as did the West Virginia court but upheld the instruction on the
ground that the indictment was broad enough to cover the statute
completely.15 This seems to be a reasonable result and one which
might well have been attained in the principal case.
V. V. o.
Stathos, 208 N. C. 456, 181 S. E. 273 (1935); Wilson v. State, 55 Okla. Cr.
22, 24 P. (2d) 296 (1933).
13 Farzley v. State, 231 Ala. 60, 163 So. 394 (1935). See also Farzley v.
State, 163 S. E. 393 (Ala. App. 1935).
4 The statute, indictment and instruction given in Farzley v. State, supra,
are almost identical with those in State v. Lewis, 187 S. E. 315 (W. Va. 1936).
A possible difference in the cases is that the form of the indictment is set
forth by statute in Alabama.
15 Farzley v. State, 231 Ala. 60, 163 So. 394 (1935) relies for its holding
on Lindsey v. State, 221 Ala. 175, 128 So. 210 (1930). The Alabama court
says that the indictment informs the defendant that he is accused of the crime
of receiving stolen goods. Since the elements of this crime are defined only by
statute, the defendant must then know that he is charged with the crime as
thus defined. Defendant is not, therefore, prejudiced by instructions to the
jury in the words of the statute.
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